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Being the leader in a group often involves making risky decisions that affect the payoffs of all 
members, and the decision to take this responsibility in a group is endogenous in many contexts. 
In this paper, we experimentally study: (1) the willingness of men and women to make risky 
decisions on behalf of a group, (2) the amount of risk men and women take for the group, in 
comparison to their individual decisions. We observe a striking difference between males and 
females, with a much lower fraction of women being willing to make the group decision than 
men.  The amount of risk taken for the group is generally lower than in the case where subjects 
decide for themselves only, indicating a cautious shift. The women that would like to make the 
group decision and the women that do not are no different in terms of how much risk they take 
for themselves, nor for their group. For men, on the other hand, we find that the ones who would 
like to lead tend to take more risk on behalf of the group. We also present several results on the 
relationship of risk-taking and leadership decisions with personality traits. 
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Being the leader in a group often involves making risky decisions that affect the payoffs of all 
members of the group.  These types of decisions can range from choosing a restaurant for dinner 
with your friends to making an investment decision for a fund subject to joint ownership. Who 
makes such decisions in a group context is usually endogenously determined, with people who 
are more willing to take the responsibility being more likely to emerge as decision-makers. Yet, 
cases where one is exogenously appointed to make such decisions are not uncommon either.   
In this paper, we study the characteristics that affect a person’s willingness to make risky 
decisions for a group, focusing on gender and individual risk attitudes, as well as personality 
traits. Our group decision context involves allocating a fixed amount of money between a risky 
and a riskless option in a setting where all group members earn the same payoff based on a single 
member’s allocation decision. We compare the actual decisions of people who prefer to make 
this group decision with the decisions of those who would prefer not to, testing whether and how 
self-selected and appointed “leaders” differ in their risk-taking.
2  
Our main focus among the potential determinants of leadership in group decision-making 
is gender. Having to make risky decisions that determine others’ payoffs is an important aspect 
of top positions in the workplace as well as in politics, public service and the military, and it is 
well-known that women occupy such leader positions much less frequently than men, both in the 
United States and in other developed and developing countries (Eagly and Karau (2002), Adler 
and Izraeli (1994), Melkas and Anker (1997), Blau, Ferber and Winkler (2002)). Motivated by 
these facts, our main goal in the paper is to study whether the absence of women from leader 
positions could arise from self-selection due to different preferences on the part of men and 
women towards taking responsibility as a decision-maker for others under risk.
3  In addition, 
given that women are usually found to be individually more risk-averse than men in experiments 
(see Croson and Gneezy (2009), Eckel and Grossman (2008), and the references therein), it is 
natural  to  conjecture  that  women’s  risk-taking  for  others  could  be  different  than  men’s. 
                                                 
2We use the term “leader” throughout the paper as a shortcut for “decision-maker for the group”. While risky 
decisions are an important component of executive decision-making and leadership, it is important to recognize that 
the concept of leadership as a whole extends beyond the aspects that our decision task captures.  
3Explanations based on the family-career balance, ability differences and discrimination have traditionally been 
proposed as potential determinants of the documented gender gaps.  3 
 
Therefore, we also study whether men and women make different decisions in the group context 
as compared to an individual risk context, and explore whether their decisions correlate with 
their willingness to be a leader. 
Interestingly, the literature that studies risk-taking decisions made on behalf of others, or 
in groups where members have correlated payoffs is relatively new in experimental economics. 
One strand of the existing literature contrasts decisions made on behalf of others with individual 
decisions. For example, Chakravarty et. al. (2005) presents the results of an experiment where 
individuals  decide  for  themselves  and  for  an  anonymous  stranger.  They  find  that  there  is  a 
decline in risk-aversion during decisions made for others.  Daruvala (2007) shows that when 
subjects make choices for others, they use a combination of their own risk preferences and their 
predictions  about  the risk preferences  of the target  group.  Both  genders predict that women 
exhibit higher risk-aversion compared to men. Another strand of the literature has considered 
how  groups  make  risky  decisions  through  deliberation  or  voting,  compared  to  individuals. 
Masclet et al. (2009) find that groups are more likely to make safe choices. Baker et al. (2007) 
find a similar result. Harrison et al. (2005) use majority voting for group decisions and find that 
social risk, i.e. the risk taken in groups can be closely approximated by individual decisions. 
Shupp  and  Williams  (2008)  show  that  group  discussion  yields  higher  risk-aversion  during 
decisions involving relatively higher risk.
4  
The current paper has connections to both strands of the literature mentioned above. We 
use the risk allocation task of Gneezy and Potters (1997) to compare individual risk -taking with 
the risk taken on behalf of a group. Following risky decisions made individually, subjects are 
placed in a group context where all members earn  equal rewards. The decision that a single 
subject makes for the group determines the payoffs of everyone in the group , including the 
decider  himself/herself.  Whose  decision  gets  implemented  for  the  group  is  determined 
endogenously. We use a design where everyone makes decisions for the group, but subjects who 
express a preference for being the group decision-maker have a higher chance for their decisions 
                                                 
4In contrast to the economics literature, in social psychology there has been a continuous interest in how individuals 
take risk when placed in groups as compared to individual decisions. Changes in decisions in a group have been  
termed “choice shifts”, with some papers finding evidence for “risky shifts” (higher risk in groups) and some for 
“cautious shifts” (lower risk in groups), under a variety of group decision-making procedures. For a survey of this 
literature, see Davis (1992). 
 4 
 
to be implemented for the group. This allows us to compare the group decisions of willing and 
unwilling leaders.  
Our main result is that there is a strong gender gap between the willingness of men and 
women  to  decide  on  behalf  of  the  group.  While  a  vast  majority  of  men  (86%)  prefer  their 
decisions to be implemented as the group decision, only about half of the women (55%) express 
such a preference. Consistently with findings in the experimental economics literature on gender 
and  individual  risk-taking,  we  find  that  women  are  more  risk-averse  than  men,  in  both  the 
individual context and in the group context. Interestingly, however, the risk attitudes of women 
have no effect on whether they would like to decide for their group or not.  In other words, 
women who take more risk and less risk individually are equally likely to volunteer to be leaders. 
Moreover, leader and non-leader women also act similarly when put in the position of deciding 
for  the  group.    In  contrast,  men  who  prefer  to  be  the  decision-maker  for  their  group  are 
significantly  more  risk-taking  than  men  who  do  not,  both  in  the  individual  and  the  group 
decision-making context. Comparing individual and group decisions for all subjects, we find that 
“cautious shifts” are frequent: for the same set of decision parameters, when the level of risk 
taken in groups is different than the risk taken individually, the direction of the change indicates 
an increase in risk aversion during in-group decisions.   
The  paper  also  contributes  to  the  recent  endeavor  of  exploring  the  correlation  of 
economic decisions with personality measures (see Borghans et al. (2008)). In addition to choice 
data, we also collect data on subjects’ personality traits, using a version of the 5-factor (also 
known  as  the  “Big  Five”)  personality  test  (Costa  and  McCrae  (1992),  adapted  by  Gulgoz 
(2002)). We find suggestive evidence that males who like to decide for the group score higher on 
“openness” and lower on “agreeableness” traits  as  compared to  males  who do not,  whereas 
women who take more risk individually tend to be less “neurotic”. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the design and 







2. Experimental Design and Procedures 
 
Our design consists of two parts: individual decision-making and group decision-making. There 
are 3 decisions in each part. In each decision task, subjects decide how much of 10 Turkish 
Liras
5 to allocate to a riskless option and how much of it to allocate to a risky option (as in 
Gneezy and Potters (1997)). While the amount invested in the riskless option is safe, the amount 
invested in the risky option is multiplied by a factor p with 50% chance (where p>1), and is lost 
with 50% chance. Subjects make betting decisions six times, three for themselves alone, and 
three on behalf of a group of five randomly selected subjects (including themselves). In both the 
individual and the group decision-making tasks, the probability of the good state, p, takes the 
values of 1.5, 2 and 2.5.   
We use random payment schemes on both decisions and subjects. Subjects are informed 
that one of the six decisions will be randomly selected at the end of the experiment for payment, 
and that a number of subjects would be randomly selected to be paid according to their choices 
in the chosen decision.
6 If the individual task is chosen for payment, selected subjects are paid on 
the basis of their own decisions. If the group task is chosen for paymen t, all of the five selected 
subjects that form a group get the same payoff. This payoff is based on the decision  of a single 
group member. Before group decision -making starts, each individual is asked whether they 
would like to be the decision-maker for their group. After this, they are asked to make the three 
decisions in the betting task (with p=1.5, 2 and 2.5) on behalf of the group, to be implemented in 
case they are chosen as the decision -maker. If more than one person wants to be the decision -
maker, a random draw among those determines whose decision counts as the group decision. If 
no one wants to be the decision-maker, one of the five people in the group is selected randomly, 
and his/her decision counts. That is, whether or not someone is willing to make the group -
decision or not, there is always a chance that their decisions could be implemented. This allows 
us to gather data on the decisions of both subjects who are willing to be the leader, and those 
who are not. 
The experiments were conducted in undergraduate economics classes at two universities 
in Turkey, Koc University and TOBB ETU, in the spring of 2010.  We have data from 128 
                                                 
5 At the time of the experiments, 1 TL corresponded to $0.62. 
6Both within-subject and between-subject random payment schemes are quite commonly used in economics 
experiments (see Baltussen et al. (2010) for a discussion of the effects of different randomization procedures).  6 
 
subjects in total (57 subjects from Koc University, 71 from TOBB). 49 subjects were female, 
whereas 79 subjects were male. The experiment was conducted by pencil-and-paper. Subjects 
were randomly assigned a unique ID number, which identified them throughout the experiment. 
All subjects were paid a show-up fee of 5 Turkish Liras. In addition, one in 5 subjects on average 
were randomly selected and paid for their decisions.
7 After subjects made the three individual 
choices, they were asked to make (1) the leadership decision, (2) the three risk decisions for the 
group, in case they are selected to be the leader for their group. Subjects never learned who was 
in their group. After all the decisions were made, one of the six decisions was  randomly chosen 
(by a die cast by a volunteer subject) to be paid.  If the decision to be compensated was a group 
decision, then all five members that formed the selected group(s) were paid the same amount of 
money, based on that group’s leader’s decision. 
After the experiment, subjects were presented with the Neo-FF-TR Personality Survey 
(Gulgoz (2002)), which rates individuals on 5 personality traits: openness, conscientiousness, 
extroversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism.    
 
3. Results  
 
3.1 Individual Risk Decisions 
 
We first present results from the individual risk decisions. Table 1 reports summary statistics on 
the amount of risk taken by males and females in the individual decision-making task. We find 
that women are generally more risk-averse than men: men allocate more money to the risky 
option  than  women,  and  the  difference  is  statistically  significant  for  p=2  and  p=2.5  (p-
values=0.004 and 0.0001, respectively, in Mann-Whitney tests). 
 
< Insert Table 1 about here > 
 
                                                 
7Since we conducted the experiment at the end of classes with volunteer subjects, we had different subject numbers 
in different sessions, leading to differences in the strength of incentives as well as in the gender composition. We 
account for these differences among sessions in our econometric analyses, and find that they do not affect our 
results. 7 
 
A linear regression with a random effects specification at the subject level also confirms that 
males take more risk, controlling for the probability of the good state, p, as well as session (see 
Table 2 for regression results). As expected, individuals also respond to the probability of the 
good state: the higher this probability, the higher the amount invested in the risky option. 
 
< Insert Table 2 about here > 
 
3.2 Leadership Decisions: 
        
Our main result concerns the willingness of men and women to decide for the group. We observe 
a striking difference between the two genders in this regard: while 86% of males (68 out of 79) 
are willing to make the decision for their group, only 55% of the females (27 out of 49) are 
willing to do so (p = 0.0001 in a two-sample test of proportions). We first study whether the 
leadership decisions of males and females correlate with individual risk-taking, captured by the 
average amount that the subject allocated to the risky option in the 3 individual decisions. Non-
parametric  tests  show  that  while  female    “leaders”  and  “non-leaders”  are  not  significantly 
different in  terms of the average  amount of  risk they take for themselves, male leaders  are 
individually more risk-taking than male non-leaders, significant at the 10% level (p=0.61 for 
females and p=0.075 for males in a Mann-Whitney test). Table 3 presents results from logistic 
regressions of males’ and females’ decision to “lead” on individual risk attitudes, controlling for 
session. Risk attitudes in the individual decision-making task have no significant effect on the 
females’ decision, but has a positive effect for males--that is, males who make riskier decisions 
for themselves are more likely to choose to decide for the group. 
 
< Insert Table 3 about here > 
 
3.3 Group Risk Decisions:  
 
We now turn to the analysis of how much risk men and women take on behalf of their group, and 
whether this correlates with their leadership decisions. Table 4 presents summary statistics for 
the amount allocated to the risky option for the group for each p, broken down by gender as well 8 
 
as  the  leadership  decision.  For  comparison,  we  also  report  the  amount  of  risk  taken  in  the 
individual decision task by these subgroups. 
 
< Insert Table 4 about here > 
 
A first question to answer here is whether females who would like to decide on behalf of 
their group take a higher or lower amount of risk for the group than males who would like to do 
so. A Mann-Whitney test shows that self-selected female leaders take less risk than male leaders 
on average (p=0.015).
8  Another interesting comparison concerns women who are willing to be 
leaders versus women who would prefer not to make this decision.  We find that females who 
choose to lead act no differently in terms of group risk-taking than females who do not (p=0.832, 
Mann-Whitney test). In contrast, there is a significant difference between leader and non -leader 
males: men who are willing to decide for their group take significantly more risk on behalf of the 
group than males who are not (p=0.0134). These results are consonant wit h our previous results 
on the correlation of individual risk-taking and the leadership decision for males and females.  
Our within-subject design also allows us to explore whether individuals take more risk in 
the group context, as compared to their choices in the individual risk task. Given the value of p, 
we see that roughly 35% (14%) of the time subjects allocate more (less) money to the risky 
option when they decide alone. On the other hand, subjects make the same allocation decision 
for themselves and for the group around 51% of the time. The average amount allocated to the 
risky option when deciding for the group is significantly lower than in the case where subjects 
decide for themselves alone (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test, p-value<0.000). That is, 
we find evidence for “cautious shifts”.  
 
< Insert Figure 1 about here > 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the mean amount of risk chosen for the group and the risk chosen 
for the self, broken down by gender and the decision to lead. The figure shows that men who 
prefer not to lead would register a sharp decline in the amount of risk they are willing to take, if 
                                                 
8We calculate the average amount allocated to the risky option by each subject in the 3 group decision tasks, and 
compare this across our subgroups.  9 
 
they were to decide for the group. That is, the tendency to engage in cautious shift is strongest 
for this subgroup. In order to understand the determinants of group risk decisions better, we also 
perform a linear regression analysis on subjects’ risk allocation for the group using a random-
effects specification.  Our regressors are the following: the amount of risk taken individually, 
dummies  for  the  probability  of  the  good  state,  a  dummy  for  being  male,  a  dummy  for  the 
decision to lead (1 if the subject wants to lead the group, 0 otherwise) and an interaction term 
between gender and leadership, as well as controls for session. Table 5 reports the results. The 
significant positive coefficient of individual risk indicates that the level of risk taken on behalf of 
the group is higher for subjects who made riskier choices for themselves. Subjects also respond 
to the probability of the good state when deciding for the group, taking significantly more risk as 
this probability increases. Interestingly, for female subjects, the decision to lead does not affect 
the risk level chosen for the group, as evidenced by the insignificant coefficient for the decision 
to lead, confirming the results of the non-parametric tests reported earlier.
9 Contrary to this, the 
negative and significant coefficient for being male, together with the positive and significant 
coefficient for the interaction term, implies that male subject s who do not want to lead decide 
more cautiously for the group compared to leader males.
10  
 
< Insert Table 5 about here > 
 
3.4 The Effects of Personality Measures on Risk-Taking and Leadership 
 
We now explore whether risk-taking and leadership decisions are predicted by the five factors 
identified  by  the  Neo-FF-TR  personality  test:  openness,  conscientiousness,  extroversion, 
agreeableness,  and  neuroticism.  For  this,  we  use  data  from  117  subjects  that  completed  the 
personality  test.  We  first  look  at  whether  the  five  personality  traits  predict  individual  risk 
                                                 
9Due to our specification of the dummy variables, the reference group in the regression is female subjects who do 
not want to lead.  
10One potential issue in our risk comparisons between leaders and non-leaders might be that non-leaders face less 
strong monetary incentives, since their decisions have a lower probability of being implemented for the group. One 
indirect way of understanding whether this is likely to be an important concern is to check whether sessions with 
different numbers of subjects (and thus incentives of different strength) lead to different risk-taking behavior on 
average. Our analyses indicate that such incentive effects do not effect individual risk-taking significantly, 
suggesting that our comparisons of leaders and non-leaders are also unlikely to be affected by incentive differences 
between the two groups.   10 
 
attitudes. In order to do this, we run regressions of the average amount allocated to the risky 
option in  the individual decision-task on the  five personality traits  separately  for males and 
females, adding session dummies as before. While none of the factors is significant for men, we 
find that neuroticism is negatively correlated with individual risk-taking for women (significant 
at  the  5%  level).  This  result  is  consistent  with  personality  studies  that  have  associated 
neuroticism with lower risk-taking (e.g. Lauriola & Levin (2001)).  
 
< Insert Table 6 about here > 
 
Table 6 displays the mean scores for the 5 traits, broken by gender and the decision to lead. 
Female leaders score higher on openness and lower on conscientiousness, whereas male leaders 
score higher on openness, lower on conscientiousness, and lower on agreeableness.  If we run 
regressions of the decision to lead on personality traits as well as risk attitudes separately for 
males and females, we confirm that male leaders are significantly more “open” and “agreeable” 
than non-leader males (see Table 7). The finding about low agreeableness could be consonant 
with leadership studies that have shown male leaders to have a less democratic style (Eagly and 
Johnson, 1990), although our group decision task is not focused on measuring this. While none 
of the traits reach statistical significance for women, women leaders tend to be more open just as 
in the case of males, and also less conscientious, as evidenced by the signs of the respective 
coefficients. These results suggest that while openness can be a general trait of leader types, 
being less agreeable is likely to be a determinant of leadership for men but not for women. A 
regression that uses the pooled data confirms that openness to experience increases the likelihood 
of deciding for the group (Table 7, column 3). 
 
< Insert Table 7 about here > 
 
4. Discussion and Concluding Remarks:  
 
Many  economic  decisions  are  made  in  group  contexts,  where  the  choices  of  an  individual 
determine the payoffs of everyone in the group. In addition, these decisions often involve a risk 
component, with gains and losses possible for everyone including the decision-maker. In many 11 
 
cases, taking on the responsibility of such decision-making is at least partially voluntary, with 
some people being more willing to make or influence the group decision. However, people also 
sometimes involuntarily find themselves in the position of deciding on behalf of others who are 
socially tied to themselves. Given this, it is important to study (1) who rises to the occasion of 
being a “leader” that makes risky decisions on behalf of others in groups, (2) how self-selected 
leaders differ from appointed leaders in their actual decisions, (3) how decisions made in the 
group context compare to cases where individuals decide for themselves in isolation. 
This paper provides a first experimental study of these issues, paying special attention to 
the relationship between gender and the willingness to make risky decisions that affect others. 
Our results raise some interesting points. The main result is that more women than men would 
rather not take the responsibility of making a risky decision that affects others, even when their 
own payoffs are at stake too. Since many decisions in top positions in the workplace involve the 
responsibility of deciding for others under uncertainty, this relative unwillingness of women to 
make such decisions can be an important reason why men are more likely to be found in leader 
positions in the workplace and in social life.
11  
In terms of the group decisions of self-selected leaders, we find that female leaders will 
take less risk than male leaders when they decide for their group, controlling for their individual 
risk attitudes. Therefore, if leadership decisions are endogenous in reality, we expect to see fewer 
female-led groups in domains involving risk over monetary payoffs, and  these groups to act 
more cautiously than male-led groups. Our design also allows us to observe how individuals who 
would rather not be leaders would act, if they were put in the position of making the decision for 
others. Leader men take significantly more risk than non-leader men for their group, whereas we 
do not find a difference in group decisions between women who want to lead and women who do 
not. Leader and non-leader women do not seem to differ in their individual risk attitudes either.  
This  suggests  that  some  other  aspect  of  preferences  might  be  behind  women’s  leadership 
choices.  
While  our  personality  data  show  that  male  leaders  are  significantly  more  open  to 
experience and less agreeable than male non-leaders, our sample size for women is not large 
                                                 
11 In this sense, our gender-leadership choice result is reminiscent of the experimental finding that women tend to 
shy away from competition, which is another self-selection result that is frequently cited as a strong explanation for 
the relative absence of women from top managerial positions (Gneezy and Rustichini (2004), Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2007), Gneezy, Leonard and List (2009)). Women have also been found to respond to competitive 
incentive schemes less favorably (e.g. Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003)).   12 
 
enough to make a conclusive point on personality traits and leadership. Based on differences in 
means, however, being less open to experience and being more conscientious emerge as two 
potential  traits  that  could  possibly  affect  the  aversion  to  taking  responsibility  for  the  group 
among women. Alternatively, leadership might simply be an unimportant decision for females, 
making them indifferent, with about half of the sample choosing to lead and half not. Further 
research is needed in order to disentangle these hypotheses and to shed more light on the reasons 
behind the gender difference in the decision to lead.  
In  general,  the  decision  to  lead  could  come  from  a  desire  for  controlling  others,  or 
alternatively, an aversion to leaving the control to others. Similarly, the decision not to lead in 
such a risky context could be based on a specific aversion to being responsible for the possible 
loss of others, or simply an indifference to relinquishing control. The former explanation also ties 
in to uncertainty about the preferences of others in the group: a fruitful direction for further 
research lies, for example, in analyzing leadership decisions when the gender composition and/or 
the risk preferences of the group members are known, or when individuals are able to pass the 
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Table 1: Amount Allocated to the Risky Option by Men and Women in the Individual 
Decision Task 
 
  Female  Male 












N  49  79 
Note: Means reported, standard 















Table 2: Determinants of Amount Allocated to the Risky Option 
 
   
Male  1.121*** 
(.365) 
p = 2  1.355*** 
(.246) 





N  384 
2 R   0.20 
 
 
Note: Coefficients reported, standard errors in parentheses. *’s denote significance at levels; ***  
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The number of observations for each of the 128 subjects is 3. A 
constant is included in all regressions but not reported. 
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Table 3: Determinants of the Leadership Decision 
 













Yes  Yes 
2 R   0.047  0.1198 
N  49  79 
 
Note: Marginal effects reported, standard errors in parentheses. *’s denote significance at levels; 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sessions effects are controlled but not reported. A constant is 
included in all regressions but not reported. 19 
 
Table 4: Amount Allocated to the Risky Option on Behalf of the Group and Individually  
 
























































N  22  27  11  68 
 






Table 5: Determinants of Amount Allocated to the Risky Option on behalf of the Group 
 
   
Individual Risk  0.668*** 
(.037) 
p = 2  0.659 *** 
(.200) 
p = 2.5  0.993 *** 
(0.220) 
Leader  -0.048 
(0.363) 
Male  -1.039** 
(0.464) 
Male Leader  1.243** 
(0.546) 
Controls for session  Yes 
2 R   0.62 
N  384 
 
Note: Coefficients reported, standard errors in parentheses. *’s denote significance at levels; *** 








Table 6:  Personality Scores by Gender and Leadership 
 

















































N  21  22  11  63 
 
Note: Means reported, standard errors in parentheses. Possible scores for each trait range 























Table 7: The Effects of Personality on Leadership 
 









Male  -  -  0.318*** 
(0.100) 
Neuroticism   0.435 
 (1.027) 
















Agreeableness  -0.009 
(0.907) 
-0.538*   
(0.277) 
-0.518   
 (0.408) 








Yes  Yes  Yes 
2 R   0.078  0.238  0.147 
N  43  74  117 
 
Note: Marginal effects reported, standard errors in parentheses. In the regression, personality 








Welcome to this study on decision-making. The experiment is going to consist of two parts. 
There are going to be 3 decisions in each part of the experiment. That is, you are going to make 6 
decisions in total. Only one of these six decisions will be used for determining payments from 
the experiment. This decision will be randomly selected at the end of the experiment, with the 
roll of a six-sided die. Every decision is equally likely to be selected, so please make all your 
decisions carefully. Your decisions will be recorded by your unique subject id, and you will be 
paid privately, in cash. You will all be paid 5 TL for your participation. In addition, at the end of 
the experiment, we will randomly select 5 participants and they will earn money according to the 
choices they made in the selected decision (out of the six decisions). 
We will now start explaining the decision tasks in the first part. Please listen carefully. If you 
have a question at any point during the experiment, please raise your hand. An experimenter will 
come and assist you. 
 
Part 1:  
 
There are going to be 3 decisions in this part of the experiment. Remember that every decision 
has an equal chance of being selected for payment.  
 
In each decision, you are going to be asked how you would like to allocate 10 TL between a 
“risky option” and a “safe option”. The amount you put in the safe option remains as it is. Your 
earnings from the amount you put in the risky option depends on chance. A coin will be flipped--
if it comes heads, your earnings from the risky option will be zero. If it comes tails, your 
earnings from the risky option will be p times the amount you put in that option. The value of p 
is written in the relevant box for each decision on your decision sheets, and it is greater than 1. 
Your total earnings from the decision is the sum of your earnings from the safe option and your 
earnings from the risky option.  
 




There are going to be 3 decisions in this part of the experiment. Remember that every decision 
has an equal chance of being selected for payment.   
 
                                                 
12 The original instructions were in Turkish.  24 
 
If a decision in this part is selected for payment, 5 people will be randomly selected to form a 
group, and each group member will get the same payoff, according to the “group decision”. The 
group decision, in turn, is made by a single member. Among the 5 group members, a single one 
will be selected as the decision-maker and his/her decision will count, to determine the payoffs 
of everyone in the group. You will not get to know the identities or decisions of your group 
members. Similarly, other members will not get to know your identity and your decisions.  
 
First, you will be asked whether you want to decide on behalf of your group or not.  You will 
mark your answer as yes/no on your decision sheets.  
 
Based on the answers of the group members, we select whose decision counts for the group in 
the following way: 
 
  If you were the only person in your group who said yes to the question of whether you 
want to be the decision-maker, then your decision will count. 
  If more than one person in your group said yes, then we will randomly select one among 
those, and the decision of the selected person will count. 
  If none of your group members (including you) wanted to decide for the group, we will 
again randomly select one among the 5 people, and the decision of the selected person 
will count. 
 
After saying yes/no to the question of if you want to decide, you will be asked how to allocate 10 
TL between a “risky option” and a “safe option” as in Part 1 on behalf of your group, in case 
your decision counts as the group decision. You will make this decision regardless of whether 
you said yes/no. Your decision will determine everyone’s payoffs in your group if you are 
selected as the decision-maker, according to the procedures described above. 
 




Please state how you would like to divide the 10 TL among the Safe Option and Risky Option 
  
Safe Option (the money you put here 
remains as it is) 
Risky Option (p=1.5) 
(if heads, the money you put here will be 
multiplied with 1.5, if tails, it will drop to 
zero) 
   
 